
Review Essays

The Iraq War and U.S.-European Relations by Leslie S. Lebl

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Friendly Fire: The Near-Death of the Transatlantic Alliance. By Elizabeth Pond. European Union Studies Association: Pittsburgh, 2004. 141 pp. \$16.30 paper

America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy. By Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2003. 246 pp. \$22.95

Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq. By Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2004. 266 pp. \$19.95

The key to success in advertising is name recognition: getting your name repeated often is a plus, regardless of whether the context is positive or negative. By that measure, Europe profited greatly from the Iraq war. It went from being the continent that didn't even merit a mention in speeches by President Bush to being the *bête noire* of much of the American public and many American experts in foreign policy. Beyond this, though, what impact will the Iraq war have on U.S.-European relations? How will the dispute over the war affect NATO in particular? How has it affected Europe's goal to develop its own foreign policy and increase its autonomy from the United States? And how has it affected public opinion on either side of the Atlantic?

The three books under review were all written by committed Atlantacists. The authors value the many benefits that accrue from close U.S.-European cooperation: all clearly hope that relations within NATO can be repaired and that transatlantic tensions will subside. However, without firm political leadership on both sides, this could prove difficult. The dispute over Iraq brings together various transatlantic tensions that have existed for many years: differences in threat perception, disagreements over Iraq and the Middle East in general, the impact of widely differing military capabilities and of an emerging "Europe," and growing transatlantic estrangement.

In the past, NATO allies overcame transatlantic crises of this order because of their mutual need to counter the Soviet threat. Today, that constraint has disappeared. Had the Iraq crisis come to a rapid conclusion, these tensions would most likely have subsided, at least in the short run. However, the situation in Iraq is unlikely to be resolved in the near future. In the absence of any serious effort on either side of the Atlantic to manage tensions and influence public opinion, the risk of permanent damage is very high.

Differences in Threat Perception

The disagreement within NATO about Iraq occurred against the backdrop of a long-running transatlantic disagreement over the dangers posed by international terrorism, as well as the proliferation of WMD. Reaching consensus on a common threat perception has been elusive since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but is critical to the long-term survival of the alliance.

The U.S. government had been arguing unsuccessfully since the 1990s that the principal threats to the West were terrorism and WMD. The lack of European interest in these topics contributed to growing American disillusionment with Europe and to a preference for unilateral actions to combat global problems. In the words of one frustrated U.S. State Department participant in a transatlantic seminar on global threat perceptions in 2001, "The Americans were interested in terrorism and WMD; the Europeans were interested in food safety."

The effect of 9/11 and the Iraq war, as well as the Madrid bombings of March 11, 2004, on European threat perceptions is ambiguous. The authors of *Allies at War* conclude, after reviewing the policy divide starting in the mid-1990s, that while the outpouring of sympathy surrounding 9/11 was sincere, "it is now also clear that the terrorist attacks exacerbated rather than attenuated the trends that were dividing the alliance."

Europe, Gordon and Shapiro report, was "reluctant to join America in its strategic revolution." Some Europeans felt that America had brought this woe on itself; most did not agree with Washington that the threat from terrorism called for a "war." While the allies committed themselves to fight against terrorism, they continued to maintain quite different views of how important the threat was, as well as how to combat it. This perception certainly matches poll data reported by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the German Marshall Fund of the United States. They found that "a small majority (55 percent) of Europeans think that U.S. policies contributed to the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C."¹

¹ Craig Kennedy and Marshall M. Bouton, "The Real Trans-Atlantic Gap: US and European Public Opinion Differences," *Foreign Policy*, Nov.–Dec. 2002.

The analysis of the allies' common threat perception is considerably murkier in *Friendly Fire*. Pond, a long-term resident of Germany, plays down any transatlantic policy differences. With no reference to the many years of sterile debates in the 1990s, she says that, in 2002, the Europeans knew that terrorism and WMD were serious threats and that international law would have to be revised to take care of these new concerns.² However, she later identifies one of the European challenges after the Iraq campaign as "how to move toward an acknowledgement in principle that Europe shared America's fears about terrorism and WMD." Then she describes the EU's European Security Strategy paper, prepared in late spring 2003, as going "much further than any previous EU statement in accepting America's post 9/11 threat assessment." A reader could be forgiven for not understanding the extent to which the lack of responsiveness from Europe encouraged the United States to disregard European views.

So, will the Europeans in the end agree with the United States on the threat posed by terrorists, possibly armed with WMD? To some degree, they already have, as witnessed in the EU security strategy referred to by Pond, to which EU leaders agreed in December 2003. And EU law enforcement and intelligence officials clearly agree with the United States, as evidenced by their outstanding counterterrorism cooperation with the United States, and among themselves, since 9/11. This agreement, unfortunately, does not extend to the question of possible links between Saddam's regime and Al Qaeda. As a result, that controversy has tended to obscure the positive trends in U.S.-European cooperation.

Initial European responses to the March 11 bombings in Madrid were similarly mixed. Whether the Spanish meant primarily to punish Prime Minister Aznar is irrelevant; the terrorists received a clear signal that it is worth their while to use terror to influence the outcome of democratic elections in Western countries.

Other European leaders appeared to understand the danger. At an EU summit later in March, they quickly took action to reinvigorate various counterterrorism initiatives.³ Later, they hastened to publicly reject Osama bin Laden's reported offer for a "separate peace." Similarly, French interior minister Dominique de Villepin, who as foreign minister was highly critical of U.S. foreign policy, is now engaged in trying to evict radical Muslim clerics from France.⁴ European leaders, though, will have to work hard to overcome

²One of the transatlantic battles the Europeans decided not to fight, in order to maintain solidarity with the United States after 9/11, was the looming struggle over a proposed protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention. The protocol had been under negotiation for six years when the Bush administration announced that it was rejecting it as unworkable. Prior to 9/11, the Europeans had overwhelmingly rejected this position.

³See "Declaration on Combating Terrorism," Brussels, Mar. 25, 2004, available at <http://ue.eu.int/>.

⁴See Craig Smith, "France Planning to Deport Turkish Man for Advocating Violence," *New York Times*, May 4, 2004.

years of willfully ignoring the terrorist threat and allowing their publics to do the same. It is simply too early to tell whether Europeans will conclude that the Islamist terrorist threat is aimed at them too, or if they will try to deflect it by distancing themselves from the Iraq conflict and/or from the United States.

The WMD question was, unfortunately, considerably muddied in the Iraq war. The failure to find stockpiles was extremely useful for critics of Bush and/or the war. The widespread assumption, most likely wrong, that the Iraqi WMD problem was either overblown or imaginary is now set in stone. Discoveries in Libya and Pakistan during the same period, arguably induced by the Iraq war, have in fact proven illegal WMD programs to be quite advanced and dangerous, but the public discussion has not connected the dots. This is one impact of the Iraq war that will likely bedevil transatlantic relations for some time to come.

Out-of-Area Disagreements

Since the founding of NATO, its members agreed on the Soviet threat but frequently were unable to agree on threats outside Europe. The 1956 Suez Crisis was perhaps the most acute example of transatlantic differences; it was the only case in which one NATO member (the United States) actively opposed the actions of others (France and Britain). In fact, the Alliance survived, in part, due to its ability to agree to disagree on out-of-area operations undertaken by its members. The decision, at the end of the Cold War, to take NATO itself “out of area” meant that future disagreements would have a direct impact on NATO’s operations—and that great care would have to be taken to manage Allied differences.

The 1991 Gulf War posed the first post-Cold War test of consensus on out-of-area operations. While the war was conducted by a large multilateral coalition, European public support was far from unanimous. In Germany, a “widespread peace movement. . . treated the American-led international coalition against Iraq as an expression of a malicious imperialist design”⁵—in retrospect, a sign of more trouble ahead.

Gordon and Shapiro provide a useful, brief summary of the emerging pattern of splits over rogue states, particularly Iraq, and the effect of these splits on U.S.-European ties. “[T]he striking feature of the Clinton years was the increasing frequency with which policy disagreements over rogue states took place along U.S.-European lines.” Of all these disputes, the most acute concerned Iraq:

⁵ Russell A. Berman, *Anti-Americanism in Europe: A Cultural Problem* (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 2004), p. 31.

[B]y the end of the Clinton presidency, the failure to agree on Iraq had become one of the most divisive issues in the Atlantic alliance. The clashes at the UN created a legacy of bitterness and betrayal that seriously damaged both sides' belief in the other's good faith as well as the belief that the UN could effectively cope with problems like Iraq.

A sobering analysis indeed. *Allies at War* goes on to do an excellent job of tracing the various stages of the dispute over Iraq. The authors offer by far the fairest presentation of both sides' views, although repeated assertions that Franco-German policy was driven purely by non-commercial interests look rather foolish after the allegations of corruption and personal enrichment by, among others, senior UN and French figures, during the life of the UN Oil-for-Food program. They argue that the Iraq dispute arose from a mix of bad moves and bad luck. Regardless of one's political views, it is impossible to argue with their point that vituperative outbursts, particularly on the part of French and U.S. officials, wrought unnecessary damage. Their plea is for more civility in transatlantic relations. Certainly, it is hard to imagine the relationship prospering without this.

What about transatlantic cooperation on policies towards other rogue states, particularly members of the "axis of evil"? Of the three books, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* is the only one that goes beyond Iraq to discuss recent U.S. policy toward North Korea and Iran, as well as Syria. Unfortunately, though, it does so in a manner that reduces its basic thesis to incoherence. In the introduction, the authors state that the United States generally now acts more preemptively against threats. They describe Bush as relying on "the unilateral exercise of American power rather than on international law and institutions" and preferring regime change to "direct negotiations with countries and leaders that he loathed." This implies a continuation of such policies well into the future—otherwise, how could it be the "revolution" described by the authors?

However, in the penultimate chapter, Daalder and Lindsay detail Bush administration policies toward Syria, North Korea, and Iran that are clearly at variance with this analysis. In the case of Syria, they conclude that, far from being evidence of intentions to strike that country, the administration's axis-of-evil rhetoric was intended to bully it into closing its borders with Iraq, shutting down terrorist offices in Damascus, and toning down official anti-American pronouncements—which approach, they note, appears to have worked. With regard to North Korea, they fault Bush for ducking and weaving: "So instead of taking responsibility for North Korea, the Bush administration tried to shift responsibility onto the shoulders of others." Indeed, they appear to fault Bush for not cleaving to his initial martial instincts. And their criticism of U.S. policy toward Iran completely fails to mention the extensive and successful diplomatic coordination between the United States and the EU. Whether or not these diplomatic efforts alter Iranian behavior, they have at least attenuated a painful dispute with the Europeans—and they certainly do not fall into the categories of "unilateralism" or "regime change."

Also of little importance is the question of whether the change in U.S. policy toward Syria, North Korea, or Iran reflects administration preferences or the lack of alternatives. All that matters is that the changes in policy have occurred. If one adds to these three examples the Proliferation Security Initiative (aimed at inhibiting illegal WMD shipments) mentioned by Daalder and Shapiro only in passing and the recently agreed-to UN Security Council Resolution 1540 on the prevention of proliferation of WMD,⁶ a fuller picture emerges.

Failing to depict these issues clearly, the authors of *America Unbound* have little to say about the future. Yet future trends could, with proper management, be quite positive. One striking aspect of recent U.S.-EU relations has been the largely positive cooperation on foreign policy and counter-terrorism at a technical level that developed simultaneously with the dispute over Iraq.⁷ The war did not disrupt this cooperation; in fact, the dispute led the Europeans to agree on the first-ever European Security Strategy (to which Pond referred) that emphasized the dangers of terrorism and WMD. The challenge for the Europeans now will be to break out of their traditional, automatic rejection of U.S. policy toward “rogue states” as well as terrorists. The challenge for U.S. diplomacy will be to keep the positive trends on track.

The Gap in Military Capabilities

European, and some American, participants at a U.S.-sponsored conference on NATO last January were startled and disturbed to hear some American speakers referring to NATO as “they,” not “us.” That speakers used that construction should hardly be surprising, given the growing technological gap between U.S. and European military forces, and the American focus on global, rather than European, security concerns. Transferring U.S. bases to the periphery of Europe to address extra-European threats will only sharpen this trend.

Europeans have for some time lamented that the capabilities gap means “the Americans do the cooking, and the Europeans wash the dishes.” That trend began in Bosnia and has continued in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Afghanistan. NATO is trying to solve the dilemma by developing a NATO Reaction Force with high-end war-fighting capabilities in which both Europeans and Americans would participate.

In this context, it is also significant that the dispute over Iraq spurred the EU to develop its own security policy. That, if anything, signals that the member states have no wish to return to the *status quo ante*, in which security

⁶ Press Release SC/8076, “Security Council Decides All States Shall Act to Prevent Proliferation of Mass Destruction Weapons,” Apr. 28, 2004, <http://www.un.org/>.

⁷ Spring 2003 saw significant and often unprecedented progress in U.S.-EU relations virtually across the board on political and law enforcement issues—except for Iraq.

policy was essentially the unique purview of NATO and in which Europeans interacted bilaterally with the United States rather than coordinating first among themselves. American policymakers who think that the United States can continue to reach transatlantic consensus by working informally with individual allies at NATO are increasingly likely to stub their toes on previously agreed-upon EU positions.

Moreover, outward appearances of NATO harmony can in fact mask profound and growing differences. Kosovo offers a perfect example of this dynamic. The Kosovo air campaign was remarkable for its unexpected display of Alliance unity. No one had expected the bombing to take so long, and there was a serious difference of views over the need for ground troops. Nevertheless, the Alliance did not break ranks, and it subsequently installed a NATO peace-keeping force under European leadership in the disputed province. For years afterwards, at least in NATO circles, this has been cited as an Alliance success story.

The Kosovo air campaign, however, came just shortly after British Prime Minister Tony Blair's December 1998 decision to agree to an autonomous EU military force, thus reversing fifty years of British policy. Prime Minister Blair no doubt had a number of reasons for doing this, including the fact that the UK was better positioned to exert leadership within the EU on military rather than fiscal or monetary affairs. But why would this most faithful ally of the United States embark on a process so likely to arouse U.S. suspicions?

Blair and others, particularly the French, argue that the development of an EU force will improve transatlantic relations, as it will encourage member states to increase military spending. But there are other motives, which were only reinforced by the Kosovo air campaign. In that campaign, the Europeans were humiliated by their relative lack of military capabilities and their exclusion from true NATO decision-making. They also had differed with the United States about the use of low-level bombing and ground forces versus bombing at 15,000 feet. They appear to have concluded that they no longer want to be pulled along by the United States into military operations over which they have so little control.⁸

Since December 1998, the EU has moved steadily ahead with its military project. In 2003, EU forces replaced NATO forces in Macedonia, thus providing the United States with an exit strategy there. EU forces are expected to assume a similar role this year in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition, after its first African operation last summer in Bunia, the EU can be expected to make a stronger contribution to UN peacekeeping.

The Europeans continually reaffirm that they see the EU force as complementing, rather than competing with, NATO forces. However, the United

⁸ For a European view, see Frederic Bozo, "The Effects of Kosovo and the Danger of Decoupling," in Jolyon Howorth and John T. S. Keeler, eds., *Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy* (Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2003). For a description of how the war was fought, see Michael Ignatieff, "The Virtual Commander," *New Yorker*, Aug. 2, 1999.

States should anticipate that, as the EU military force gives them more options, Europeans may feel less bound to follow the U.S. lead at NATO, particularly if doing so involves controversial operations such as Iraq. Efforts to mount out-of-area NATO operations may also become more complex, as both NATO and the EU will be drawing largely on the same pool of soldiers and military capabilities for their missions. Successful “deconflicting” of EU and NATO operations will be the prerequisite to smooth transatlantic relations. Observers may well look back in ten years at the Iraq invasion as the defining moment in setting limits on NATO’s out-of-area operations.

These EU developments, as the obverse of increasingly unilateralist U.S. policy, are important to any analysis of the U.S.-European relationship. Pound discusses the EU strategy paper, although she does not appear to recognize its potential impact on NATO decision-making. Gordon and Shapiro understand the need for the EU and NATO to work together, as well as for improved European military capabilities and a coherent global policy. But none of the authors seems aware of the extent to which European efforts to develop a separate foreign and defense policy could affect NATO or transatlantic relations. It is disappointing enough that the U.S. State Department is largely oblivious to these EU developments, but even more disappointing when little new thinking emerges from prominent scholars.

So what will happen to NATO? Even successful development of the NATO Reaction Force will not answer the question of when it can be used. Nor did the Iraq war resolve the tension arising from the discrepancy between America’s vast military might and Europe’s capabilities. Even if NATO agrees to a role in Iraq, these issues will remain under the surface, and Europeans will continue to develop a European-only defense policy.

Many Europeans (and some Americans) hope that the Iraq war will lead to a better understanding in Washington of the limitations of the American military machine and a corresponding greater appreciation of European militaries. That could happen, and if so, would be welcome. However, there is a catch: the lesson that “success has many fathers, but failure is an orphan” applies to Iraq in spades. If the United States fails in Iraq, Europeans may savor the (considerable) pleasure of being right. If the United States succeeds, however, the Europeans’ reticence may come back to haunt them, as it will only reinforce the argument that, for waging war, multilateral alliances are more of a burden than a blessing to the United States.

Anti-Americanism and Anti-Europeanism

When the United States engaged in Western Europe after World War II, it did so with the clear understanding that a good part of the battle would be for the hearts and minds of Europeans. America’s political dominance and its direct military presence in Western Europe were thus accompanied by a range

of programs designed to explain U.S. policy, society, and culture to Europeans and to build a thick web of ties between Americans and Europeans. By and large, these programs were a resounding success.

As the immediate Soviet military threat receded, so did the sense of transatlantic closeness. During his tenure in Bonn in the early 1980s, U.S. Ambassador Arthur Burns was struck by the degree to which young Germans and Americans were already growing apart. He spent much of his time addressing this problem of "generational drift"; at one point, young Berliners said he paid them more attention than did their own elected representatives.

Unfortunately, other American officials have been less concerned with this trend, which accelerated after the fall of the Berlin Wall, as the U.S. Congress cut funding and successive American administrations lost interest in Europe. Meanwhile, transatlantic links have been developing rapidly on their own, and not all of the results are positive.

Since the Berlin Wall fell, Europe has experienced rapid Americanization, including the intertwining of Europe's economy with America's and the spread of the internet and global communications in general. The increasing use of the English language within Europe has only reinforced this trend. On the other hand, Europe's elites and media, along with a substantial segment of the public, have become distinctly more anti-American, as the generation that was already "drifting" rose to positions of power. The growing presence of the EU definitely affects this process: since one of the easiest ways to "build Europe" is to do so "against" the United States, anti-Americanism fills an important need for some.

Friendly Fire offers, inadvertently, an excellent manual on how European elites view the United States. In the preface, Pond states that she wants to avoid structural analysis, concentrating more on "the context, texture and proximate dynamics at each point." That she certainly does. *Friendly Fire* illustrates the negative prism through which many Europeans view the United States today. It also reflects a profound lack of understanding of what the Bush Administration is trying to do, as well as a relative blindness to ways in which Europeans irritate their American counterparts. The result is a confusing collage of troubling exchanges.

Pond's essay faithfully echoes the themes uppermost among Europe's chattering classes in the last five years. These include, among others: downplaying allegations of anti-Semitism in Europe;⁹ emphasizing the impact the American religious right and Jewish groups have on American Mideast policy¹⁰

⁹ This problem has since been recognized. See the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) report, "Antisemitism in the EU 2002–2003," available at <http://eumc.eu.int/eumc/index/php>, as well as the Berlin Declaration issued by a ministerial-level conference of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on anti-Semitism, held in April 2004 in Berlin, at www.osce.org.

¹⁰ Ibid.

while obscuring the fact that support for Israel has enjoyed widespread support from the American public over the years;¹¹ and stressing European achievements in building peace and prosperity while ignoring the U.S. role in pushing European unity and in providing a protective shield for more than fifty years. (Pond only acknowledges the U.S. in a backhanded way, when she identifies potential U.S. hostility as one of two major dangers to European unification.)

Americans increasingly return the negative sentiments. In 2003, while the Bush administration and American neoconservatives gained the most notoriety for their dismissive view of Europe, they were far from alone. Many career professionals in the State Department and elsewhere in government shared the sense of irritation that Europeans were getting more attention than they deserved.¹² The American public was split between long-standing habits of friendship and cooperation and contempt for a region that wouldn't invest in its own defense.

Many observers see a clear break between reactions to the invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11, which Europeans supported, and the Iraq war, which they did not. To some degree that is true, but it should not be exaggerated. After a brief hiatus between 9/11 and President Bush's "axis of evil" speech in January 2002, the anti-American storm resumed, in increasing fury. Berman argues that "September 11 and its aftermath proved to be a turning-point in European anti-Americanism, which has become an increasingly open and acceptable attitude."¹³

There is little doubt, however, that the Iraq war had a highly damaging impact on these trends. According to the Pew Center for the People and the Press, in a report on views in nine countries published in March 2004, only 37 percent in France, 38 percent in Germany and 58 percent in the UK held favorable views of the United States. This was mirrored in U.S. views: only 33 percent of Americans held favorable views of France versus 50 percent for Germany. The UK, at 73 percent, fared considerably better. France and Germany finally got the attention they so wanted from the United States—but it was negative, not positive.

When asked, European interviewees frequently make the distinction that they like America or Americans, but not the Bush administration or its foreign policy. Opinions differ as to whether that distinction is significant, or if Europeans are simply so distracted by their dislike of President Bush and his policies that they forget the tensions that existed prior to January 21, 2001. Sudden dips have occurred during past crises, but the dynamics this time may

¹¹ Gerard Baker makes this point in "US Support for Israel is Sincere," *Financial Times*, Apr. 22, 2004.

¹² See the famous article by Martin Walker, "U.S. Diplomat's View of Europe," *Washington Times*, Nov. 14, 2002.

¹³ Berman, *Anti-Americanism in Europe*, p. xii.

differ, given the lack of a Soviet threat to draw the United States and Europe together. And it appears that the rise of the EU is having an effect. In a poll conducted soon after the Iraq war, "Germany, the long-time American ally, now expresses an unambiguous preference for Europe over the United States."¹⁴

Public opinion is flighty and changeable, but it cannot be dismissed. As former Kohl foreign policy adviser Michael Mertes said, "If anti-Americanism pays domestically, how reliable is Germany as an ally when the moment of truth finally comes?"¹⁵ In how many European countries, aside from Germany and Spain, will anti-Americanism help win elections?

While the three books reviewed here focus primarily on relationships between governments, as well as within the U.S. government, they also devote some attention to public opinion. All three conclude, basically, that the main problem lies with the Bush administration, a problem exacerbated by its decision to invade Iraq. A Democratic administration would presumably lead the international community rather than just expecting others to follow. It would join the general European consensus on everything from global warming to genetically modified foods. It would understand and value European security concerns and contributions to peacekeeping operations. All these changes would mark a significant step forward. The authors are certainly right that Europeans prefer liberal Democrats to conservative Republicans. But the problem would be far less intractable if the frictions of recent years stemmed only from the administration, which they do not.

Is a drift into dislike, contempt, and eventually hatred inevitable? Maybe, but several steps could be taken that might make a difference. For a start, Americans could adopt a more civil form of discourse in general. How can anyone reasonably expect European anti-Americanism to subside when it is continually fed by the unbridled accusations, invective, and vituperation that characterize current debates in the wake of the collapse of bipartisan U.S. foreign policy?¹⁶ Gordon and Shapiro's point on the value of civility applies not only to senior government officials, but also throughout the United States, to all whose irresponsible dialogue is causing lasting damage in Europe.

Beyond the question of civility in public debate, the State Department, White House, Congress, the U.S. business and academic communities, among others, could reengage in public diplomacy. How can the United States expect

¹⁴ *Transatlantic Trends 2003*, conducted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, based on fieldwork conducted June 10–25, 2003. Eighty-one percent of German respondents listed the EU as most important to Germany's vital interests, versus 9% for the United States.

¹⁵ Quoted in Richard Bernstein, "The German Question," *New York Times Magazine*, May 2, 2004.

¹⁶ See Moises Naim, "The Perils of Lite Anti-Americanism: Why Knee-Jerk Criticism of the United States Carries Dangerous Hidden Costs," *Foreign Policy*, May–June 2003, and Berman, *Anti-Americanism in Europe*, pp. 4–5.

to gain European support while using none of the tools that were considered essential for achieving that goal the last time it undertook a major strategic initiative?¹⁷

European leaders who sided with the United States on Iraq, with the obvious exception of Blair, could also take the initiative to explain to their publics why they did so and why it was important. (Danish prime minister Rasmussen, in the midst of the spring 2003 crisis, published an article explaining clearly and forcefully why he believed Denmark should support the United States in Iraq. It was a rare example.) Supporting the United States simply because it's the big boy on the block only adds to Europeans' underlying envy and resentment.

Any or all of these steps could greatly influence the eventual impact of the Iraq war on transatlantic relations.

Conclusion

Allies at War, with typical American pragmatism, concludes by offering a series of projects that the United States and Europe could pursue jointly as they repair their relationship. Many of their suggestions are already under discussion, from consolidating the counterterrorism coalition to cooperating on Iran to promoting a two-state solution in the Middle East and reform in the greater Middle East. But will this level of joint cooperation do the job? Or is it sufficient, as the authors of all three books appear to hope, for Bush to be voted out of office and the neoconservatives to lose ground? One is left with the nagging worry that neither joint cooperation nor a new administration would do the trick, as neither would address any of the underlying divergent trends.

To some degree, the difficulty in seeing the situation clearly arises from the very success of NATO. Europeans and Americans have gotten used to working together, reinforcing natural affinities and familial and cultural ties. With such ingrained habits of cooperation, it is hard to imagine another way of doing things.

While building the EU is easier if it is done "against" the United States, the French challenge to set up Europe as a counterweight to the United States—to return to a multipolar world system—has found little resonance elsewhere in Europe. Enlarging the EU only increases the number of voices supporting cooperation with the United States. Europe may yet end up being a U.S. opponent, but it probably will only do so if the United States gives it a big push in that direction.

¹⁷ See Jeffrey Gedmin and Craig Kennedy, "Selling America—Short," *The National Interest*, Winter 2003/04, for concrete suggestions on how to restart U.S. public diplomacy.

The Romans, Persians, Egyptians and others consciously built their empires. The United States has fallen into the role of global hegemon largely by accident, and certainly without funding or formulating any clear plans as to how to handle the role. The attention it can give Europe is limited when it has not yet decided how to pursue its "empire"—or if it has or even wants one—and while it has many global hotspots competing for its attention. As a result of the Iraq dispute, Americans finally noticed what Europeans were saying about them and decided to return the compliment. U.S. tempers have cooled, but both government and public appear undecided as to how much effort they want to invest in the relationship with Europe.

Thinking on both sides of the Atlantic would probably be clearer if there were a precedent in which two friendly powers that shared many values and interests had cooperated, rather than competed, in a global security system without a clearly-defined opponent. Historians will look back at the early twenty-first century either as a time in which imaginative leaders carved out another unique set of institutions like those set up after World War II, or as a time of gradual disintegration and fragmentation of the West. Let us hope it is the former and not the latter.

The U.S. Search for Grand Strategy by **Charles Hill**

Charles Hill is a distinguished fellow of International Security Studies at Yale University and a research fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

Richard J. Art, *A Grand Strategy for America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). \$64.50; \$26.50 paper.

Charles A. Kupchan, *The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002). \$27.95; \$15.95 paper.

Bradford A. Lee and Karl Walling, eds., *Strategic Logic and Political Rationality: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel* (London: Frank Cass, 2003). \$75; \$26.50 paper.

Max G. Manwaring, Edwin G. Corr, and Robert H. Dorff, eds., *The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-first Century* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003). \$64.95.

Invariably, as Secretary of State George Shultz's plane was returning to Andrews Air Force Base after a long overseas trip, the scene would be repeated. The traveling press corps would gather in the forward compart-